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ANTITRUST

Competition policy can conflict with environmental protection.

Conservation
Cartels
B Y J ONATHAN H. A DLER
Case Western Reserve University

I

n the 1930s, frank manaka sought work

as a fisherman off the coast of Monterey, California. He chartered a boat but was unable to market
his catch. Local canneries would not purchase fish
from him. In 1940, he filed suit against the Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc., a cooperative association of fishing boat owners, and the Del Mar
Canning Company for allegedly conspiring to set prices and
restrict entry into the California sardine fishery. Under an
agreement between the association, the local canneries, and
the local fishermen’s union, the association set the price for
which its members’ fish were sold to canneries and reduction
plants. The canneries, in turn, agreed to purchase fish exclusively from members of Monterey Sardine who were
assigned to it by the association. Manaka was not a member,
so he could not sell his fish and so he sued.
Although Monterey Sardine may have operated like the
typical collusive cartel, it served both pecuniary and conservation purposes. On the one hand, it increased members’
profits by increasing fish prices and restricting entry by nonlocal fishers. On the other, it helped to conserve fish stocks
by limiting the harvest. Challenged by Manaka, Monterey
Sardine Industries was found guilty of conspiracy in restraint
of trade under the Sherman Act. The federal district court
held that the association was “not freed from the restrictive
provisions of the anti-trust act” merely because it sought “the
conservation of important food fish.” In other words, the
association’s conduct was no less exclusionary because it
served, in part, to conserve fish stocks.
In the 1930s, the California sardine fishery was at its peak,
Jonathan H. Adler is an associate professor of law and associate director of the Center
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yielding over 500,000 tons of fish per year. By the early
1950s, the annual catch had dropped to under 20,000 tons
as the fishery began to collapse. It is possible that the sardine fishery’s decline was unavoidable. Commercial harvesting might have depleted the fishery even if Monterey
Sardine Industries’ collusive arrangement had been permitted to survive. Changing environmental conditions
might have made the collapse inevitable. Then again, perhaps if it were not for antitrust enforcement, this tragedy of
the marine commons might have been avoided. The existence of a private association capable of ensuring the local
fish catch was maintained at a sustainable level might have
saved the fishery. Busting up this “conservation cartel”
might have made the fishery more “competitive” in a narrow sense, while at the same time undermining the equally important goal of resource conservation.
Off the California coast and elsewhere, fishermen who
sought to organize such “conservation cartels” to manage
fisheries and control catches were prosecuted for antitrust
violations. At the same time, the depletion of ocean fisheries
continued apace, to the point where fishery depletion has
become one of the greatest environmental problems on the
planet. Antitrust law, though well-intentioned, may have discouraged — if not in some cases actually prohibited — private arrangements that could ensure the sustainable utilization of marine resources.
THE MARINE COMMONS

Conservation of marine fisheries presents the archetypal
“commons” problem, most famously depicted by ecologist
Garrett Hardin in “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Hardin
described the fate of a common pasture, unowned and available to all. In such a situation, it is in each herder’s self-interest to maximize his use of the commons at the expense of the
community at large. Each herder captures all of the benefit
from adding one more animal to his herd; the costs of over-

The incentives for such behavior are strong in the fishery context because the marginal cost of an active fisherman increasing his effort is often quite small compared to the potential economic reward. Fishers do not benefit from self-restraint
because none have any assurance that other participants in the
fishery will follow suit.
Open-access fisheries have suffered from the tragedy of the
commons just as Hardin would have predicted. On the open
seas, overcapacity — what many describe as “too many boats
chasing too few fish” — is the norm, resulting in substantial
depletion of fishery stocks worldwide. Approximately 65 percent of fisheries are fully exploited or overexploited, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,

MORGAN BALLARD

grazing the pasture, however, are distributed amongst every
pasture user. When all the herders respond to the incentives
created by the open-access nature of the commons, the pasture is overgrazed. “Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world
that is limited,” Hardin wrote. The pursuit of self-interest in
an open-access commons results in a tragedy; “Freedom in
a commons brings ruin to all.”
This analysis applies well to most marine fisheries; indeed,
it was described and documented by fishery economists over
a decade before Hardin’s influential essay. So long as there is
open-access to the fishery, each fisher has an incentive to catch
as much as possible, even beyond the point of sustainability.
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and that number continues to climb. An additional 10 percent
of fisheries are “significantly depleted.”
The plight of domestic fisheries is no less grave despite
several decades of federal regulation. In 2003, the National
Marine Fisheries Service (nmfs) reported that 66 fish stocks
were subject to overfishing and another 86 species were
already overfished. In the same report, the nmfs acknowledged that out of the 932 fish stocks under federal management, the status of nearly 700 is unknown. While the nmfs
reports the number of healthy fish species has increased in
recent years, such gains have come at tremendous cost to
local fishing communities faced with fishery closings and
other stringent conservation measures. Populations of onceabundant food fish such as cod, haddock, and flounder may
be near collapse.
PRIVATE PROPERTY The initial choice of solutions to the commons problem, as described by Hardin, is between political
controls and some form of private property. “The tragedy of the
commons . . . is averted by private property, or something for-

tas.” Nonetheless, individuated private property rights in fisheries are the exception.
Where property rights in fisheries exist, they tend to be collective or “common property”
rights. As Margaret McKean and Elinor Ostrom observed,
“Common property regimes are a way of privatizing the rights
to something without dividing it into pieces.” Typically, such
regimes evolved where the marine resources require greater
control and more efficient use, but other factors make individuated ownership too costly or otherwise culturally undesirable. In such cases, the rules governing the use of the fishery are somewhat informal, often arising out of local custom
or community practice. In other cases, there have been efforts
to adopt formal collective rules to limit catches and conserve
the underlying resource. In each case, the management regimes
have evolved over time in an effort to increase the returns to
the users of the resource.
Common property and other “collective” approaches to
fishery management appear to have been quite successful

COLLECTIVE ASSOCIATIONS

Conservation of the commons requires privatization or
government regulation to control access and limit
overuse of the underlying resource.
mally like it,” he explained. But where private property is lacking, the commons can only be saved by “mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon.” As Hardin presented it, conservation
of the commons requires privatization or government regulation. In either case, the aim is the same — to control access
and limit overuse of the underlying resource.
Private property tends to avert the commons problem
because property owners have a substantial incentive to maximize the value of the resource in question. This necessarily
requires accounting for the value that others place on the
resource and the value of sustaining the resource over time. The
benefits of property ownership do not depend on each owner
acting solely, or even primarily, with a profit motive, however. In addition to providing incentives for greater resource stewardship, property rights also foster private ordering by reducing the transaction costs associated with negotiating over
remaining externalities.
Despite the potential benefits from property rights, individuated ownership in fisheries is generally lacking. Many fish
species are mobile across vast expanses and access is difficult
to monitor. Those factors, among others, make it particularly
costly to define and enforce property rights in the marine context. There are some exceptions, however, such as privately
owned oyster beds, and a handful of countries have moved
toward property-based fishery management regimes known
as “individual transferable quotas” or “individual fishing quo40
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where they have emerged. Such arrangements often evolved
over time so as to facilitate both the exploitation and conservation of the resource in question. Today, some fishing
communities have turned to various cooperative approaches, including common property, to help rationalize fishery
management. Collective associations also may have a comparative advantage against government agencies in regulating fishing activity, particularly in the development, acquisition, and distribution of relevant information about fish
stocks, fishing activity, and the like. In New Zealand, holders
of individual fishing quotas have begun to collaborate to conserve fish stocks by, among other things, monitoring catch
levels and supporting fishery research.
Despite the potential benefits of propertybased fishery management regimes, the dominant
approach to fishery conservation — where conservation has
been attempted at all — has been government regulation. In
practice, such regulations turn the fishery from an openaccess resource into a “regulated open-access” resource, and
the results have been little better than one would expect in
the open-access commons. Fishers operating under “regulated open access” have little incentive to steward the underlying resource or support sustainable regulatory measures.
Even where fishery management decisions are made by
“expert” administrators, resource users typically view longREGULATION

run decisions as “substantially unpredictable and unresponsive.” The lack of a concrete property interest in the fishery means that individual fishers have no expectation that
sustainable management will inure to their benefit. Thus,
they push regulatory entities to allow higher harvest rates.
This problem is compounded by the scientific uncertainty
inherent in fishery assessments, as this provides fishers with
an excuse to push for less conservative catch limits.
Fishery regulations have typically taken the form of limits on season length, boat size, equipment, and even total seasonal catch. None have worked particularly well, largely
because they fail to alter the open-access nature of the
resource. Season limitations produce a “race to fish” as fishers seek to catch as much as possible before the fishery is
closed. The results are rampant overcapitalization and a
destructive “derby” system in which each fisher races to catch
as much as he or she can before the season closes. Mandates
on the type of equipment that can be used — an effort to control total catch by mandating that fishers use less-efficient
means of catching fish — encourage fishers to increase their
investment in additional vessels or gear to compensate for the
efficiency losses. Efforts to protect fisheries by directly controlling entry have not fared much better. License systems
may limit the number of boats of firms in the fishery, but they
do not control the amount of effort. As with season limitations, license limits also tend to encourage overcapitalization
and the “race to fish.” The regulated commons seems no less
prone to tragedy than Hardin’s uncontrolled one.
C O N S E R VAT I O N V S . C O L L U S I O N

Where formal private property institutions are absent, users
of marine commons may nonetheless seek to organize themselves into communities or associations — what could be
called “conservation cartels” — to manage and maintain the
marine commons. The arrangements can be seen as an effort
to define and enforce quasi-communal property rights
where such rights are absent. In the commercial context,
fishery associations often organize to limit the catch. The
limits are often indirect, achieved through the setting of minimum prices or the exclusion of outsiders, as the impetus for
such measures is higher profit for the fishery rather than its
sustainable utilization over time, and enforcement costs preclude more direct measures. Irrespective of the motivation
that drives the formation of such associations, the impact on
the fishery is the same. Private associations that limit the
catch can help ensure the fishing practices remain sustainable over time. Nonetheless, such environmentally beneficial
arrangements are subject to antitrust prosecution.
Resource conservation requires limiting consumption to
sustainable levels. The number of fish caught in a given season cannot be greater than the regenerative capacity of the
fishery, or fish populations will decline. Fishery output must
be restricted. Yet antitrust law is inherently suspect of private
arrangements that restrict output. When harvests are
restricted, prices will increase above competitive levels. In
economic terms, conservation may yield monopoly rents for
producers. Private actors who seek to protect environmen-

tal resources by agreeing to limit the exploitation of the
resource are doing precisely what antitrust law forbids. From
the perspective of resource conservation, we recognize the
value of conserving a natural resource by restraining consumption to sustainable levels. From the antitrust perspective, any agreement or association that seeks to restrict output or otherwise raise prices above their competitive levels
is a pernicious market influence to be expunged. In short,
what conservation demands, antitrust condemns.
Beginning in the late 1930s, there were several private and
public prosecutions of fishermen’s unions and other cooperative efforts to limit fishery exploitation. While in many, if not
all, of those cases the motivation for adopting measures to
limit catches was pecuniary (i.e., the fishers sought higher
prices for their goods), the conservation potential of such
arrangements was evident. At a time when fishery conservation had yet to become a matter of great public concern, fishers adopted means to limit the fish catch to sustainable levels.
Despite those potential conservation benefits, the conservation cartels were uniformly held per se illegal arrangements under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Today, antitrust law
continues to limit collaboration among fishers in regulated
fisheries, although some fishing cooperatives have escaped
antitrust condemnation.
The application of per se rules in the context of resource
conservation is a potential problem because what antitrust
enforcers fear — agreements that restrain output — is precisely what conservation demands. When a monopolist or
cartel restricts output, it is harmful to consumers because it
tends to increase prices and reduce consumer welfare. When
a conservationist reduces output, however, it can be beneficial to consumers because it sustains a valuable resource.
Conservation of a depletable resource requires limiting consumption. Such limits will tend to increase prices by lowering the market supply of the resource, while at the same time
preventing future price increases by ensuring a long-term
supply of the resource in question. By reducing consumption
in the short run, conservation can actually increase consumption in the long run and therefore enhance consumer
welfare. Agreements among resource users may also help to
overcome free-rider problems or otherwise facilitate beneficial cooperation. In this sense, such agreements are efficient
(even if they increase price or reduce output) as they address
some of the inefficiencies resulting from the existence of a
common pool resource. Nonetheless, conservation agreements can run afoul of antitrust law’s prohibitions. As a
result, antitrust law may be inhibiting the evolution and development of voluntary associations and community-based
conservation measures that conserve marine resources.
T H E C O N S E R VAT I O N C A R T E L S

Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries was not an isolated case. In

the 1930s and 1940s, there were several antitrust actions
against fishers’ unions throughout the country. In some
cases, the suits were brought by government authorities. In
others, private plaintiffs used the antitrust statutes to seek
treble damages against the defendants. In case after case, the
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41

ANTITRUST

courts found against the fishers’ associations and condemned their cooperative efforts as collusive attempts to
restrain trade in seafood products.
In California, for example, the federal government successfully prosecuted Local 36 of the International Fishermen
& Allied Workers of America for conspiracy to “restrain
trade” in fresh fish and crustaceans. Approximately 75 percent of the fishers operating out of southern California were
members of Local 36. Members of the union were convicted of setting minimum prices for which they would sell
seafood to local dealers, agreeing to sell their catch solely to
those dealers who would contract with the union and engaging in various tactics, including boycotts and picketing, to
induce dealers to contract with the union. The union ultimately sought to prevent non-members from fishing off the
coast of southern California and selling their catch in southern California ports, thereby enabling the union to control
the catch and charge higher prices. Local 36, like the union
defendants in most of the fishery cases, unsuccessfully
sought to demonstrate that fishers’ unions were subject to
antitrust law exemptions provided to labor unions and certain types of agricultural cooperatives, including fishing
cooperatives.
The indictment of Local 36 acknowledged that “except for
the illegal restraints described hereinafter, a much greater
volume of fresh fish and crustaceans would have been
brought to the fishing ports . . . and sold, processed, and distributed.” Irrespective of whether the restrictions were
adopted with conservation in mind, they had the same effect
as would have conservation measures on the fishery: they
reduced the volume of fish caught. Yet this was part of Local
36’s crime. By reducing output, Local 36 may have been
helping to conserve fisheries off the Pacific Coast, but they
were also “prevent[ing] the public from receiving a normal
and usual supply of fresh fish” and maintaining non-competitive prices. Whether this had broader economic impacts
on fish markets was immaterial, as was whether the contract
price was “reasonable.” As the court noted, “Unless specifically authorized by legislation, a conspiracy to fix prices is
in and of itself a violation” of the Sherman Act. Conservation or other benefits were immaterial: “No inquiry as to substantiality, directness, effectiveness, or reasonableness of
restraint is permitted.”
The fact that collusive arrangements among fishers and
processors could have positive environmental impacts has
been acknowledged by reviewing courts — and explicitly
deemed irrelevant for purposes of the antitrust analysis. As the
court made explicit in the Manaka case:
Such an association as that of the boat owners is not
freed from the restrictive provisions of the anti-trust
act, because they profess in the interest of conservation
of important food fish to regulate the price and the
manner of taking such fish unauthorized by legislation
and uncontrolled by proper authority.
While the government may sanction collective efforts to
42
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control output or increase prices, the courts deemed independent conservation efforts tantamount to the defendant
unions “taking the law into their own hands.”
The fact that fishery users are driven by their pursuit of
profit to create associations and adopt measures that could
facilitate the long-term conservation of ocean fisheries is not,
as of yet, a consideration in the application of antitrust laws.
Rather, as the Supreme Court noted in another context, “the
interest of the public in the preservation of competition is the
primary consideration.” Indeed, some courts viewed private
cooperative efforts to reduce fish harvests as presumptively
suspect. In Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, a private
antitrust action for damages against the Pacific Coast Fishermen’s Union, the court suggested that to allow private associations to conserve fish stocks without government approval
would unduly threaten the public’s right to have fish:
In any year when defendant’s members did not ‘choose
to fish’, how would the consuming public get its needs
of salmon, tuna, and other marine products from North
Pacific waters? Since the union’s contract does not guarantee a supply of fish, where would the canneries get
fish, having agreed to look to the union for their sole
supply? Surely reasonable men will agree that the public’s interest in an important item of food supply should
not be put in such jeopardy.
Left out of the court’s analysis was any consideration of
where the “consuming public” might “get its needs” of fish
should unrestrained harvests produce unsustainable levels of
consumption in Pacific fisheries. Surely, higher-priced fish are
preferable to no fish at all.
GCSOA Perhaps the best know antitrust prosecution of a
fishery association involved the Gulf Coast Shrimpers and
Oystermans Association (gcsoa). In the 1930s, shrimpers
and oystermen operating along the Mississippi coast created the gcsoa to increase their revenues by controlling prices
and limiting entry. The gcsoa entered into contracts with
local shrimp and oyster packers and canners whereby all
association members would sell their shrimp and oyster
catch to contracting packers and canners. In return, the packers and canners agreed to purchase all of the catch offered
by association members and to provide other services. Some
of the packers owned boats of their own that also abided by
the association’s rules.
The federal government brought suit against the gcsoa for
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. Specifically, the government alleged the association prohibited its members from selling shrimp and oysters below set prices and barred participating packers and canners from purchasing catches below the
set price or purchasing the catch of non-member fishers. Violators were subject to fines, suspension of membership, and forfeiture of proceeds from the offending catch. The gcsoa also
encouraged picketing and boycotting of non-participating
packers and canners. On this evidence, the gcsoa and several of its officers were found guilty of antitrust violations.

Although the gcsoa engaged in proscribed conduct, it
is not at all clear that the union’s activities were anticompetitive or otherwise harmed consumer welfare. In their
study of the case, Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap found
that the union explicitly sought to alter the harvesting practices of its members. The union set a floor on shrimp prices
based upon shrimp size, specifically the number of tails per
pound. This price was generally greater than prevailing market prices for small shrimp. This discouraged the catching of
smaller shrimp, so shrimpers shifted their harvests to later
in the season when shrimp are larger and worth more. It also
served to lessen the overall shrimp catch, as shrimpers were
not driven to catch more lower-value shrimp to cover their
expenses. Interestingly enough, Libecap notes, union price
floors for larger shrimp were generally no higher than the
prevailing market price, suggesting that the challenged
arrangements did not have an anticompetitive effect.

which could be brought into the three ports named.” Specifically, the union adopted rules limiting the volume of fish of
various species that could be brought in by a boat on each
trip and setting minimum prices for fish sales. According to
the Massachusetts trial court, the artificial limitations on fish
supplies made it probable that “fish cost more to the Massachusetts buyer and the Massachusetts ultimate consumer”
than it would have otherwise. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court concurred, finding that the union’s “direct and intentional limitation of total production and the arbitrary fixing
of prices” was unlawful without even needing to consider
“whether prices have actually reached a level which by some
standard can be pronounced unreasonable.” The positive
environmental benefits of reducing fish catches off the
shores of Massachusetts were not considered.
Notwithstanding the successful state prosecution of the
Atlantic Fishermen’s Union’s anticompetitive conduct, Patrick

The effect of the antitrust litigation was to inhibit the
development of nongovernmental cooperative
structures that could have addressed fishery problems.
Until the arrangement was struck down, it was apparently
successful at discouraging the harvesting and sale of smaller,
less-mature shrimp in Mississippi. The state’s shrimp prices
were generally higher than those in neighboring Louisiana,
reflecting the greater proportion of larger shrimp for which
consumers would willingly pay higher prices. From this evidence, Libecap concluded that “private group regulations of
fisheries could be an alternative to government regulation if
that option were politically acceptable.” Yet it was not. Years
after the gcsoa was challenged in court, government regulations were adopted with the same goal of increasing the value
of the local shrimp catch by discouraging the catching of smaller shrimp early in the season.
STATE ACTION Associations of boat owners and fishing crews
were also subject to potential antitrust actions under state law.
Massachusetts successfully enjoined the Atlantic Fishermen’s
Union and its members from conspiring to “control completely
not only the catching but the marketing and price” of all fish
caught by boats operating out of Gloucester, Boston, and New
Bedford by operating a “selling room” through which all union
members were required to sell their catch. The stated purpose
of the union was to improve working conditions and ensure
that its members received a “fair share of the profits of our labor
commensurate with the dangers and hardships” of fishing.
Most boat crews operating out of Massachusetts at the time
consisted of the union’s members.
Among other things, the union was accused of maintaining fish prices “by limiting the quantities of fresh fish

McHugh, an officer of the union, was subsequently subject to
federal prosecution for his anticompetitive actions under the
Sherman Act. In this case, the court noted that McHugh’s
actions through the union “effectively limited the quantity and
species of fish landed in New Bedford. . . . Had it not been for
defendants’ illegal restraints, a ‘much greater’ volume of scallops and other fish would have been brought into and sold in
the port of New Bedford.” Again, that such actions might facilitate the conservation of local fisheries in the long-run was not
considered by the court.
STRUCTURE AND INCENTIVES

The various marine conservation cartels were not perfect.
Most were clearly focused more on maximizing receipts for
their members than on fishery conservation. But the effect of
the litigation was to inhibit the development of nongovernmental cooperative management structures that could have
addressed fishery problems. That the unions’ motivations
were pecuniary or otherwise “impure” should be of little consequence; Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” does not depend on
noble intentions but self-interest. From a conservation perspective, what matters is whether institutional arrangements
developed — or could have developed — to ensure sustainable utilization of the resource. Congress would not enact the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act for
another two decades, and that act has been largely ineffective.
It is possible that collusive fishery organizations, whatever
their costs to consumers, would have done more to conserve
marine resources and ensure their long-term supply. Yet by
R EG U L AT IO N W I N T E R 2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 5
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declaring such conservation cartels illegal per se, the courts
effectively foreclosed any experimentation with such
approaches to fishery conservation.
Were it simply enough for fishery associations to set catch
limits, it might be easy to condemn the other restraints
adopted by Monterey Sardine, the gcsoa, and the other fishers associations as anticompetitive. Yet it is not enough to
adopt the simple horizontal restraint to protect the partnership. Because of the incentive to cheat, the restraint must
be enforced. Participants in a given fishery may agree to catch
limits, but there is no assurance that they will abide by the
limitations. As with any cartel, there is tremendous incentive to cheat. Indeed, the more successful the partnership is

necessarily be legal under federal antitrust laws. It does, however, suggest that such arrangements should not be inherently suspect.
RECONCILING COMPETITION
W I T H C O N S E R VAT I O N

Antitrust law has evolved substantially since the prosecutions
of the gcsoa and other fishery associations. There is a growing recognition that many arrangements that appear anticompetitive have the potential to enhance consumer welfare.
All economic agreements have the potential to restrain trade
to some degree. Yet some such agreements may benefit consumers by increasing the efficiency of producing firms, there-

Cooperative fishery management may appear
anticompetitive and even reduce output, but it has the
potential to serve conservation goals.
at controlling the catch, the greater incentive there is to cheat.
In a marine fishery, cheating is difficult to control. The activities and catches of individual boats are difficult to monitor.
It is easier to police landings or sales to canneries, particularly as there will typically be fewer canneries than fishers.
Thus, the fishing association enters into contracts with the
canneries to monitor or control the volume of fish caught.
Minimum prices can help maintain fisher income, potentially reducing the incentive to cheat. They will also reduce
the quantity of fish that canneries will purchase. The vertical aspects of the arrangement — the contracts between the
fishermen and the canneries — serve to help control shirking and free riding by individual fishers.
Another threat to the viability of such a partnership in a
marine fishery is the entrance of outsiders. So long as there is
open access to the fishery, conservation efforts remain a questionable investment. A fishing association cannot limit the
catch if non-member fishers are free to catch fish from the same
fishery. The conservation cartel addresses this concern by making contracts with canneries exclusive, so that non-member
fishers cannot sell their fish in competition with the association. Such contracts protect the cartel by protecting its investment in the conservation of the fishery.
Despite their anticompetitive appearance (if not effect), such
conservation measures ensure a long-run supply of fish and
thus may be welfare enhancing, the harm to individually
excluded fishers not withstanding. The short-term efficiency
losses caused by the exclusion may be outweighed by the longterm efficiency gains from conserving the underlying resource
and maximizing resource output over time. Protecting an individual fishery from depletion may be pro-competitive insofar
as it maintains the fishery as a viable source of fish for consumers. That does not mean that all such arrangements should
44
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by reducing prices. Where courts once rigidly applied per se
rules to condemn a wide range of cooperative conduct among
firms, they are now willing to take a closer look at the potential economic benefits of cooperative behavior.
This increased appreciation of the potential for otherwise
anticompetitive arrangements to serve broader societal goals
suggests that courts should reconsider the per se condemnation of cooperative fishery management. While such conduct
may appear anticompetitive and may even reduce output in
some cases, it also has the potential to serve conservation goals
and thereby enhance total welfare. For this reason, cooperative
efforts to limit or otherwise control fish catch should be analyzed under the rule of reason. Such a shift in approach is largely consistent with contemporary antitrust doctrine and would
enhance the prospects for sustainable fishery management.
To date, courts have not been asked to address this question
directly. There are no cases evaluating efforts to solve coordination problems in the context of an open-access commons;
indeed, there are no reported antitrust cases even addressing
conservation concerns in the fishery context over the last 30
years. The cases condemning voluntary efforts to reduce or
control fish catch have yet to be called into question, let alone
overturned. As the law stands, efforts to conserve marine fisheries through private, cooperative efforts risk prosecution
under the Sherman Act.
There are a handful of successful fishery cooperatives in
operation, but their ability to actively participate in the management of the underlying resource remains constrained by
antitrust concerns. Federal antitrust authorities could help
facilitate the acceptance of collaborative conservation
efforts, but they cannot immunize such arrangements from
antitrust scrutiny. Should the courts fail to apply the rule of
reason to conservation-enhancing agreements among

resource users, however, statutory reforms could be considered. Yet a statutory “fix” has the potential of imposing a
“one-size-fits-all” rule in an area where context-specific judgments may be more appropriate.
In the conservation context, the cost of an overly restrictive antitrust rule is not simply the invalidation of marginally more efficient economic arrangements. In at least some
instances, the cost of an overly restrictive rule is the continuation of unsustainable fishery practices that threaten to
deplete, if not exhaust, marine fish populations. The tradeoff to be made is between the risk of economic inefficiency
and that of substantial environmental harm. While restrictions on output may be undesirable from a consumer welfare standpoint, such potentially anticompetitive behavior
may be net welfare-enhancing in comparison to the likely
alternative of fishery depletion. Viewed in this light, there
seems to be ample justification for evaluating the potentially collusive conduct of private fishery associations under the
rule of reason, rather than a per se rule.
Insofar as antitrust laws inhibit the development of formal
cooperative arrangements among resource users, it forces users
to adopt one of three courses, all of which may be substantially
less optimal than the reliance upon formal cooperative efforts
to control resource use. First, they may seek government regulatory measures to limit consumption of the resource. Given
the poor record of regulatory measures aimed at conserving
fish stocks, that is a less-than-ideal course. The adoption of
property-based conservation schemes may provide substantial benefits, but such proposals can be politically difficult to
implement. A second option is to adopt informal community restraints upon overfishing. Such measures can be quite
effective at controlling catch levels in many contexts. Formalizing such arrangements is not an option, however, as to
memorialize the rules into formal contracts is to raise potential antitrust concerns. A third option is simply to leave well
enough alone and to extract rents from the fishery so long as
one can. Given the nature of open access commons, this latter course may well lead to both economic and ecological ruin.
The obstruction of cooperative solutions to the commons
problem is not likely to be unique to fisheries policy. At heart,
most if not all environmental problems are commons problems of some sort. Admittedly, where total catch limits are
in place, antitrust law is more tolerant of agreements among
fishing firms to allocate portions of the catch. Such arrangements enable firms to capture some, but not all, of the gains
that would come from private property. Moreover, where
there is no government-imposed limit on the total catch
from a fishery, the limitation on vertical integration in fishing cooperatives — that is, the limitation on agreements
between fishers and processors or wholesalers — can make
it more difficult for fishing firms to implement self-enforcing cooperative ventures.
CONCLUSION

The purported aim of antitrust law is to improve consumer
welfare by proscribing actions and arrangements that reduce
output and increase prices. Conservation aims to improve

human welfare by maximizing the long-term productive use
of natural resources, an aim that often requires limiting consumption to sustainable levels. While conservation measures
might increase prices in the short run, they enhance consumer
welfare by increasing long-term production and ensuring the
availability of valued resources over time. That is true whether
the restrictions are imposed by a private conservation cartel or
a government agency.
Insofar as antitrust law fails to take this into account, it bars
the creation and evolution of ecologically valuable and socially beneficial arrangements among resource users. The threat
to consumer welfare from potentially collusive arrangements
is real, but no more so than that of resource depletion and environmental ruin. A conservation cartel may force consumers to
pay higher prices for a time, but the failure to conserve marine
resources may lead to species extinction and ecosystem disruption. It is time to consider that the costs of antitrust law to
conservation are greater than the threat of conservation carR
tels in the marine commons.
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